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 Abstract  
 
People gain enjoyment from exercising their agency and interacting with others in order 
to accomplish projects and change reality, as is evident from the successful evolution of 
homo sapiens. Hence, time can be enjoyable in both pursuing and achieving socially 
valued goals. Since modern economic progress offers products in growing abundance, 
thus increasingly exploiting individuals’ time and interaction, people are tempted to seek 
enjoyment in another way, i.e. in consumption itself, as homo economicus would suggest. 
On the basis of various evidence, the paper argues that people can choose between these 
two ways leading to well-being; that the homo economicus way is less effective or even 
perverse; and that economic progress weakens people’s skill to undertake the homo 
sapiens way. These arguments help explain why the economy of a country, such as the 
USA, can grow over decades whereas its citizens become less able to enjoy their lives. 
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 2 
1. Introduction 
 
Humans are social animals, and their culture is a unique social product. This 
statement, which few would deny, implies that homo sapiens evolved by enjoying 
interaction with others while conceiving new ideas and making artefacts (Tomasello, 
2014; Suddendorf, 2013; Earl, 2013). By doing so, he changed the natural and social 
environments as well as himself. Therefore, humans do not simply enjoy the moments 
when they satisfy basic needs; they typically enjoy the passage of time when dealing 
with others, and when they exercise agency to change reality. Translated into a testable 
proposition for our times, we might say that people’s life satisfaction and longevity 
depend not only on their economic conditions, but also on their social relationships and 
their ability to control their own lives (e.g., Helliwell et al., 2018; Giordano et al., 2019; 
Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014). 
However, homo economicus, as conventionally conceived, includes in the utility 
function neither others’ communications and intentions, unless instrumentally to earn 
consumption goods, nor the exercise of his agency, but only the outcomes. Moreover, 
when homo economicus deals with time, as in the case of work and study time, he 
considers it a disutility. Therefore, other people, skilful effort and time are used as costly 
instruments with which to achieve the optimal basket of consumption goods. But in this 
way, the representation of homo economicus lacks the aspects that many studies on 
human evolution and well-being have found to be most significant. 
Despite the ability of homo economicus to earn a growing quantity of 
consumption goods that enable him to lead an increasingly satisfying life, empirical 
evidence shows that the opposite is true in at least one important case: that of the USA, 
which has exhibited substantial economic growth in recent decades, but a declining trend 
in a variety of measures of well-being and mental health of the population (Stevenson 
and Wolfers, 2008; Herbst, 2011; Twenge et al., 2010, 2015). 
This evidence is especially puzzling because recent technological progress has 
increasingly provided people with opportunities to communicate, move to meet others, 
and acquire the knowledge and skills useful for conceiving new aims, new projects. The 
possibilities to further develop the special characteristics of sociality and cultural skills 
of homo sapiens appear to have expanded. Why has the realisation of these possibilities 
not ensured people to enjoy more well-being? 
The present paper proposes a conceptual framework in which to answer this 
question by recognising that both homo economicus and homo sapiens are partially 
successful in interpreting people’s actual behaviours. Our basic assumption, in fact, is 
that people are endowed with a meta-utility function with two options: a sub-utility that 
includes the special goods arising from relating with others and exercising agency, 
which is typical of homo sapiens, and the standard sub-utility function typical of homo 
economicus. The two options can be viewed as two ways leading to individuals’ well-
being. Their main difference concerns the use of time in triggering an internal dynamics, 
while the material goods used are not distinctive, since both options may need the same 
types of goods.
1
 
                                                 
1
 These two ways leading to well-being echo the distinction in ancient Greek philosophy between 
‘eudaimonia’, i.e. living by functioning well and by realising one’s potential, and ‘hedonism’, i.e. seeking 
pleasure (Pugno, 2019). This distinction has been tested with encouraging results in many psychology 
studies by capturing the former with measures on purpose in life and personal growth, and the latter with 
measures of pleasure and comfort (Huta, 2015; Keyes and Annas, 2009). Traces of this distinction can be 
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Individual choice between the two options is obviously conditioned by the 
economic, social and institutional context, so that it is possible to study the effects of the 
process of economic growth on an individual’s well-being. In fact, higher income tends 
to relax an individual’s budget constraint for both options, but modern technological 
progress changes the conditions of time use, thus exerting a different impact on the 
dynamics of the two options. Study of these changes will reveal that the individual’s 
tendency to specialise in the homo sapiens option may be reversed into the tendency to 
specialise in the homo economicus option. 
Our final argument is that this substitution is not advantageous for at least one 
reason: that the homo sapiens option develops inner capabilities and culture 
endogenously, i.e. it produces new resources by itself, whereas the homo economicus 
option essentially needs economic resources, which make an individual’s well-being 
more vulnerable to negative economic shocks.  
The proposed conceptual framework thus makes it possible to obtain a number of 
results. First, homo economicus represents human behaviour neither in an essential way, 
as it appears in mainstream economics, nor in a false way, as argued by various critiques. 
Homo economicus instead represents altered human behaviour, so that he does not 
represent normative human behaviour either, as claimed in behavioural economics. The 
second result is that social relationships can be considered under a new light as being 
able to bring well-being to people as special goods, rather than being instrumental to 
obtaining more consumption goods. The third result is a linkage between social 
relationships and the exercising of agency as a pleasant, although effortful, activity 
which may thus contribute to increasing knowledge and improving culture. The fourth 
result is a possible explanation of the puzzling fact that economic growth does not 
guarantee a rising or even a flat trend in people’s well-being. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls that the model of 
homo economicus inadequately represents the enjoyment gained from pursuing goals 
and relating to others. Section 3 characterises humans as able to enjoy exercising and 
reinforcing their own agency and skills in synergy with others. Section 4 identifies the 
skills that are necessary for human development. Section 5 documents the puzzle posed 
by the case of the United States. Section 6 proposes to explain the puzzle by observing 
that economic growth tends to weaken the homo sapiens way leading to well-being, and 
to reinforce the homo economicus way, which is less effective or even perverse. The 
final Section concludes. 
 
2. Does homo economicus enjoy time and social relationships? 
 
Homo economicus, or the ‘rational economic man’, is a fictitious representation 
used in mainstream economics in order to predict the behaviours of ordinary individuals. 
More precisely, it is mostly used to predict how ordinary individuals make choices 
between alternatives. But how does homo economicus pass his time? Does he enjoy how 
time passes? 
Homo economicus is usually represented when he makes optimum choices on 
consumption, work and leisure time, studying and saving, on the basis of well-defined 
information and probabilistic beliefs. He renews choices at every external shock to these 
                                                                                                                                                
found in the Cambridge tradition, i.e. between ‘activities’ and ‘wants’ in Marshall (1920[1890]), between 
‘creative’ and ‘defensive’ products in Hawtrey (1926), which then inspired Scitovsky’s (1976) distinction 
between ‘stimulating’ and ‘comfort’ activities (Pugno, 2016). 
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variables, including possible shocks to his preferences, which otherwise remain stable. 
This representation implies that homo economicus should spend his time realising the 
choices that he has made. He should thus enjoy consumption and leisure, while studying, 
working, and saving remain instrumental to this goal. He considers the time required for 
these latter activities to be a cost that he would eliminate if he could. On the other hand, 
economic growth appears as a positive shock, since it has a positive impact on his 
monetary income, and therefore on his expected utility. 
Enjoying only consumption and leisure thus restricts the proportion of pleasant 
time. But another and heavier limitation should be underlined. Since homo economicus 
takes consumption and leisure as the final goal, the past and the future are irrelevant 
when he achieves and enjoys the goal. But enjoying only the present when goals are 
achieved does not interpret how people attempt to maximize their well-being, as is 
evident from the famous case of the ‘experience machine’ devised by the philosopher 
Robert Nozick. In this case, individuals have the possibility to choose to live attached to 
a fantastic machine able to provide them with the experiences that they would like to 
have had. It is not at all obvious that people would choose in such a way, because – thus 
argued (Nozick 1974: 43-45) – “what we desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in 
contact with reality. (And this, machines cannot do for us.) […] we want […] to be a 
certain sort of person […] to do certain things [and…] thinking we’ve done them.” 
A further limitation of the representation of homo economicus when he enjoys 
time is to ignore the fact that people like to spend time with others. The justification for 
this limitation may be that people are engaged in so many activities in such diverse 
circumstances while interacting with others that it is difficult to identify the proportion 
of enjoyment and costs in each activity (Jara-Díaz and Rosales-Salas, 2017). Homo 
economicus finds it convenient, instead, to consider others as instruments in performing 
activities like exchanging goods, competing on the market, or even consuming goods in 
interaction with others. Indeed, the frequent critique that self-interest in homo 
economicus is unrealistic is usually made in terms of inequity in sharing material 
resources and opportunities. Therefore, when homo economicus expects to perform 
activities that involve others, he ignores the dimension of time, and thus the very sense 
of human sociality. Even more so, he ignores any social skill that may make the 
activities shared with others either pleasant or disappointing. 
 
3. How to enjoy time and social relationships 
 
The representation of homo economicus is subject to several assumptions that 
have been extensively discussed in the literature. Two of them are largely ignored, 
however, while they are rather restrictive. They concern the relationship between means 
and ends, and the types of goods consumed, which exclude the special public good that 
individuals produce and consume when they interact. Let us consider the two 
assumptions in turn. 
Ends are normally assumed as distinct, known, and well-defined, so that the 
solution of the choice problem can be determined. In this case, ends can be called 
immediate to distinguish them from more distant ends, for which immediate ends are 
means. The more distant ends can be called intermediate in that they eventually serve 
the final ends. For example, people not only study to have a good job, or work for pay, 
or earn to consume; they may also study, work and consume to accomplish specific 
projects on the job, or with the family, or in other social activities. These are the 
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intermediate ends that serve the final ends of leading a healthy and satisfying life, and, 
eventually, of contributing to the successful evolution of the human species. 
In non-human animals, the immediate ends are evolutionarily selected to serve 
the final end of the survival of the species, with no intermediate ends. But the human 
species has the unique characteristic of having developed the skill to build culture by 
accomplishing specific projects, which thus contribute to forming intermediate ends. 
Each individual may have his/her personal projects by following his/her inner talent, and 
by taking advantage from the opportunities that become available through economic 
progress and the realisation of the projects of others. Each individual can thus be 
creative, rather than a simple follower of tradition and socially conformist. In aggregate, 
people’s originality in realising their projects enables culture to evolve. 
However, homo economicus would encounter two serious problems from this 
perspective. First, the conditions of choice become fundamentally uncertain (Dow, 
2015) because the outcomes of projects may not be known in advance, and also the type 
and the number of projects may be not known because some of them may become 
available only after the preceding projects have been undertaken. No intertemporal 
optimization is thus possible. If homo economicus proceeded by optimizing in local 
settings, step by step, the dynamics would be path-dependent, and no single optimal path 
to the equilibrium would emerge. Second, some means necessary for the ends, such as 
certain activities, may cease to be costly if the pursuit of the projects develops homo 
economicus’ inner talents, thus making him content with himself.
2
 In this case, the 
motivation to undertake such projects is called ‘intrinsic’ in psychology, and it may 
crowd out the conventional economic motivation, with the consequence of altering the 
effectiveness of incentive-based policies (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; 
Bowles and Polanìa-Reyes, 2012).
3
 
Homo economicus exhibits another inadequacy, besides being limited in local 
settings in order to choose optimally: he does not consider that individuals produce and 
consume public goods in their interaction, thus failing to enjoy social relationships in 
themselves (Gui and Sugden, 2005; Pugno, 2009). Homo economicus instead considers 
the services of others only as private goods and objects of exchange, so that he normally 
sees others as sources of costly means in terms of their time and skills.  
However, if we recognise that people can pursue projects, we must also recognise 
that even individual projects are embedded in the community’s culture, meaning that 
individuals produce public goods that they themselves consume and others may 
consume. Vice-versa, when others pursue their projects, the individuals can consume 
public goods produced and consumed by others. Such public goods typically arise when 
individuals learn from others, directly or from the past stock of culture, when they 
discuss their own ideas with others, when they convert an idea into a project with others’ 
collaboration, and when they offer the successful result of the project to others who may 
find it useful.
4
 
                                                 
2
 According to a meta-analysis in psychology, the positive association between successful goal striving 
and subjective well-being becomes stronger when successful goal pursuit is defined as goal progress, 
instead of goal attainment (Klug and Maier, 2015).  
3
 Intrinsic motivations appear to be especially effective when the tasks are complex and creative (Camerer 
and Hogarth, 1999; Amabile and Pillemer, 2012). 
4
 Some psychologists observe that interpersonal relationships based on interest in others and on the 
exchange of ideas bring more well-being to people than do relationships based on the need to be simply 
accepted by others (Lavigne et al., 2011; Pillow et al., 2015). 
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To be more precise, illustrated by the following informal model is how an 
individual can produce and enjoy the special public good that arises when s/he creatively 
interacts with others. The arguments are based on theoretical analysis and evidence 
gathered in different streams of research in economics and related disciplines (Pugno, 
2016). 
The inputs of this public good are individual’s consumption goods, his/her initial 
preferences, talents and skills, his/her time, and the skills and time of others, within a 
certain institutional context. The individual can obviously utilise the available inputs 
only partially, but all inputs are essential up to some minimum amount, above which 
they can be imperfectly substituted one with the other.  
The outputs are several: an increase in the individual’s skills, which may change 
his/her preferences (Heckman and Corbin, 2016; Bowles et al., 2001); the individual’s 
greater well-being; and, possibly, ideas and things useful for others, thus contributing to 
others’ production of public goods of this type. Such goods are public because new ideas 
are neither rival nor easily excludable. Since the individual gains advantage from 
producing these ideas and goods, the typical problem of under-producing public goods 
does not arise. 
The transformation of the inputs into outputs consists of searching and 
undertaking the activities most suited to the inputs available in order to realise the 
envisaged project. In particular, the more the activity and its difficulty are suited to an 
individual’s talents and skills, the more satisfying is not only the achievement of the 
expected results, but also the performance of the activity, which involves the exercise of 
his/her agency (Sen, 1985A) and a challenge to his/her skills (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; 
Delle Fave et al., 2011). This is a learning experience that enables the individual to 
improve his/her skills. The special property of endogenous dynamics thus emerges, 
because improved skills provide better inputs to the performance of more challenging 
activities, and the expected satisfaction from doing this provides the proper (intrinsic) 
motivation. Time and effort are no longer considered simply as costs for the individual, 
and the development of his/her skills goes together with developing fruitful relationships 
with others. All this contributes to the enjoyment of a satisfying life. In particular, skills 
and relationships are resources useful for dealing with adversities. 
Finally, the possible output of new knowledge and things, up to discoveries and 
inventions, becomes the individual’s positive externality offered to his/her community. 
This output, together with the input of others’ ideas and knowledge, besides material 
concerns, makes the individual and his/her community dynamically interactive. If such 
interaction regards a sufficient number of similar agentic individuals, the community 
evolves endogenously, by also changing its organisation and institutions, so that the 
environment changes for the good of the whole community. 
The following example helps imagine this dynamics. A girl wants to be a guitar 
player in a band, confident that she has some talent for this. If she has the opportunity to 
take guitar lessons, she can explore whether she has the right talent for it, rather than for 
some other instrument, and whether she can easily face increasing levels of difficulty, as 
established by conventions and experts. The closer the match between the girl’s skill and 
the difficulty, and the greater her social recognition, the higher becomes her satisfaction, 
and the greater her improvements in playing the guitar. Time devoted to playing the 
guitar becomes characterised by both effort and passion. When this undertaking is 
successful, the girl can even achieve excellence and introduce musical innovations. 
 7 
These achievements may be facilitated by expert musicians with whom she plays, as 
well as by favourable musical fashions. 
The development of an individual’s skills and social relationships, however, is a 
very uncertain process. Apart from exogenous shocks, the conditions in which the 
individual chooses how to develop are fundamentally uncertain because of limited 
knowledge about the skill/difficulty match, which is in fact new and different across 
people and situations.  
Therefore, learning, exploring activities, and interacting with others become a 
process of searching for the best match so that the realisation of projects becomes fully 
satisfying. In this case, the individual pursues a way of life which includes effort, 
uncertainty, challenge, failures, but also realisations, discoveries, increases in knowledge, 
competence, and others’ recognition. Enjoyment arises from the overall package, i.e. 
from living time as a constructing process that is a part, however small, of human culture.  
 
4. The skills needed to enjoy time and social relationships 
 
In order to pursue life projects, people need skills; and every project requires 
specific skills. Typically, formal education provides skills useful for finding a good job. 
But what kind of skills should people develop to ensure positive social relationships and 
a satisfying life? How can universal and objective skills with which to realise such 
subjective experience be identified? How is it possible to exclude evil skills like those of 
certain dictators who, although bloodthirsty, are acclaimed by their community and 
happy with themselves?
5
 
A step forward in understanding this issue has been taken by Nobel laureate 
James Heckman, who has distinguished two broad categories of skills: cognitive and 
socio-emotional skills as specified in the psychology literature. The former includes 
intelligence, problem solving, memory, language; the latter includes social interaction, 
trust, locus of control, personality traits. Heckman has then found that the lack of one of 
these two categories of skills determines an individual’s negative outcomes, such as 
school dropout, incarceration, and teenage pregnancy (Heckman and Corbin 2016; 
Heckman et al., 2006). These results are important for extending the concept of skills to 
the socio-emotional ones, thus also extending the relevant period of skill formation to 
the early stage of human life. However, these results are also limited because they 
mainly focus on disadvantaged people, and are less useful for understanding how culture 
can evolve.  
The second step has been taken by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who 
shares with Nobel laureate Amartya Sen the Capability Approach, i.e. the idea that 
people’s capabilities, besides their material resources, are central for freedom and well-
being.
6
 In particular, Nussbaum provides a list of ten central capabilities that should be 
guaranteed to every human being in order to make greater progress in social justice. She 
further recognises that some capabilities can be learned, so that they can be developed 
over the individual’s life-cycle (Nussbaum, 2011). However, Nussbaum’s contribution is 
                                                 
5
 The issue of evil skills is under-researched in economics, but it is addressed in the philosophical debate 
on the Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’, i.e. on whether exercising one’s most effective skills to pursue some 
personal goals guarantees human flourishing as the universal goal in life (Haybron 2007; Angier 2020). 
6
 According to Sen (1985B, pp.13-14), “the ‘capabilities’ of [a] person […] reflect[..] the various 
combinations of functionings he can achieve”, where ‘functionings’ refer to “what the person succeeds in 
doing with the commodities and characteristics at his or her command” (Sen, 1985B, p.10). 
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limited because it is only normative and not interpretative, and because it does not 
identify the relative importance of each capability. On the other hand, the contribution of 
Sen, who thought it unnecessary to provide a list of the most important capabilities, is 
also limited, because it mainly concerns comparative assessments of quality-of-life, 
rather than an individual’s choice to develop his/her capabilities, so that his approach 
remains static (Heckman and Corbin, 2016; Pugno, 2017). 
The third step has been taken by human need-based approaches. Ian Gough’s 
approach, for example, provides a list of needs that people of every culture must satisfy 
to avoid serious harm. He distinguishes between ‘basic needs’, which are the “physical 
and mental capacities a person must possess to pursue their goals, whatever these goals 
are” (Gough, 2015, p.1197), and ‘intermediate needs’, which are goods and services that 
can satisfy the basic needs, and are thus contingently pursued. Gough identifies two 
basic needs: physical health and personal autonomy, which is defined as “the ability to 
make competent informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing 
it” (ibid.). Therefore, this approach provides a specific and hierarchical list, but it lacks 
explicit dynamic analysis, which would clarify that the two basic needs differ, and with 
far-reaching consequences. In fact, physical health is an objective and well-defined state 
that people want to maintain and re-establish if harmed, i.e. it is a satiable need. By 
contrast, personal autonomy can be learned and indefinitely developed along subjective 
lines without being completely known in advance. Humans share the need for physical 
health with the other animals, but ‘personal autonomy’ is unique, and it has enabled 
humans to build a unique culture.
7
 
A further step forward in the search for the skills that people should develop to 
ensure positive social relationships and a satisfying life can be made by drawing from 
studies on the evolution of the human species, specifically backed by comparison with 
other animals. This step enables us to go to the origin of all skills that are typically 
human, while the possibility to satisfy subsistence needs becomes a constraint on such 
development. The matter is still debated, but an agreement on two skills clearly emerges: 
the ability to imagine counter-factual alternatives to reality, and the ability to exchange 
thoughts with others (Suddendorf, 2013; Bulley et al., 2020; Tomasello, 2011, 2014).
8
 
Combining these two skills makes the human species able to collaborate in order to 
create and realise new common goals as a cumulative process. Implicit in the 
development of these human skills are other more specific skills that work in synergy, 
like language, and the skills required to travel over time, over situations, and across 
others’ minds. The development of these skills has led the human species to enlarge 
collaboration from small to ever larger groups throughout human history, although the 
process has been beset by conflicts and far from smooth. 
Much research has focused on the problem of why free-riders, who maintain self-
regarding preferences like homo economicus, have not prevailed in the course of human 
evolution, thus destroying social public goods. More than one hypothesis is supported by 
the available evidence. Some researchers argue that the groups of homo sapiens had to 
collaborate from their origin to raise children, because human babies needed substantial 
and prolonged care (Burkart et al., 2009). Other researchers argue that more 
                                                 
7
 Human need-based approaches find theoretical convergence with and an empirical grounding in the 
psychological Self-Determination Theory (Fellner and Goehmann, 2019). This reveals the complexity of 
the concept of ‘autonomy’ and the need for dynamic analysis (Pugno, 2008). 
8
 Earl (2013) notes that humans evolved by thinking creatively and by seeking pleasure in social activities, 
thus essentially using emotions, besides rationality, to take decisions. 
 9 
collaborative individuals tended to search for collaborating partners, thus forming 
homogenous and more successful groups (Barclay and Raihani, 2016). Still other 
researchers argue that punishing free-riders enabled the selection of collaborating groups 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2013). These hypotheses do not seem mutually inconsistent, and 
they may explain why human collaboration is successful, without eliminating self-
interest, since collaboration is eventually convenient for all individuals. 
We can thus call agentic and social skill the core skill that drives human 
evolution, and that can characterise both the individual and the community. This core 
skill has cognitive and socio-emotional components, thus confirming the argument of 
Heckman and many others that human skills begin to develop during infancy. Specific 
studies on babies in fact show that the skill to imagine counterfactuals and to collaborate 
with others arises very early, i.e. when the influence of others is at the minimum 
(Gopnik et al., 2000; Gopnik, 2009). The agentic and social skill then drives human 
development over the life-cycle, as confirmed by the positive link of some indicators of 
this skill with people’s health, longevity, and life satisfaction.
9
 
 
5. The puzzle 
 
Homo economicus is a fictitious model that does not necessarily have to be able 
to interpret human evolution because it may have been designed to interpret and predict 
modern behaviour. In particular, homo economicus indicates that his utility will increase 
if income grows, because his budget constraint relaxes. However, this prediction raises a 
puzzle if we adopt the long-run perspective, as the following case shows. 
The United States is the case considered because it is the leading country in the 
world for its industrial and technological power, and because it exhibits relatively low 
intervention by the state in the economy and high economic freedom. This suggests that 
homo economicus is an effective model with which to interpret the behaviours of the US 
population, relatively to those of other countries. The puzzle is that the USA has 
experienced in the most recent decades both substantial economic growth and a 
declining trend in people’s life satisfaction and other indices of their well-being.
10
 
The empirical evidence is quite abundant. Specifically, the decline is evident for 
life satisfaction of (a nationally representative sample of) the population aged 18 or over, 
distinctly for women and men, in the period 1985-2005 (Herbst, 2011), but it is also 
evident for happiness
11
 of the same type of population sample in the longer period 1972-
2016 (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Bartolini et al., 2013; Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2019). These results are consistent with the increasing trend of a number of other 
measures: two indices of mental depression in college students during the period 1950s-
                                                 
9
 The main skill indicators used as evidence are: ‘having purpose in life’ (Schaefer et al., 2013; Cohen et 
al., 2016), ‘internal locus of control over one’s life’ (Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Cobb-Clark et 
al., 2014), and ‘trust in others’ (Ljunge, 2014; Giordano, 2019; Helliwell et al., 2018). 
10
 This puzzle is a stronger version of the ‘Easterlin paradox’, according to which “at a point in time 
happiness varies directly with income both among and within nations, but over time happiness does not 
trend upward as income continues to grow. Happiness is used here […for] subjective well-being, 
including life satisfaction and the Cantril ladder-of-life” (Easterlin, 2017, p. 312, italics added). 
11
 ‘Happiness’ is usually measured by using the following survey question: “Taken all together, how 
would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?” 
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2010 (Twenge et al. 2010, 2015),
12
 major depressive episodes in adolescents and young 
adults, in both the lowest and the highest income groups, during the period 2005-2015 
(Mojtabai et al., 2016; Weinberger et al., 2018), and some measures of milder malaise, 
such as ‘having trouble getting to sleep’ and ‘feeling under great pressure most of the 
time’ in both adults in the period 1985-2005 (Herbst, 2011), and young people in the 
period 1980s-2010s (Twenge et al., 2015).
13
 The overall trend of the suicide rate among 
young people from 1975 to 2016 was also increasing, in spite of a decline in an 
intermediate period (Ruch et al., 2019). 
This evidence is heterogeneous because of the limitations of the indicators and 
because of the underlying possible explanations. But it remains striking, because it 
points in the same worrying direction despite the increase in resources that could have 
countered this set of malaises, such as antidepressants (Pratt et al., 2011). The evidence 
is instead confirmed by the disappointing evolution of physical health and longevity in 
the US population since the 1980s (see Muennig et al., 2018, and the references cited 
therein), which surprisingly ranks the USA first within the OECD sample for the share 
of people suffering from bodily aches or pains (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2019). 
Our conceptual framework suggests that an explanation for all this evidence is 
the weakening of the skills typical of homo sapiens. Indeed, a number of indicators 
capturing the agentic and social skill of the US population show a long run decline. This 
is in fact the case for the following: the internal locus of control over one’s life among 
young people, which declined from 1960 to 2002 (Twenge et al., 2004); social and 
intrinsic motivations at work in young people, which declined from 1976 to 2006 
(Twenge et al., 2010B); people’s trust in others, which declined from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-2000s (Robinson and Jackson, 2001; Bartolini et al., 2013); the network of 
confidant friends, which declined from 1985 to 2004 (McPherson et al., 2006); a 
‘secure’ social attachment, which declined from 1988 to 2012 (Konrath et al., 2014);
14
 
and even creative thinking in young people, which declined from 1984 to 2008 (Kim, 
2011). 
With these suggestions in mind, the next section explains, with some details, the 
puzzle illustrated by the case of the USA, although this may not be the only one.
15
 
                                                 
12
 One index of depression used by Twenge et al. (2010) is based on the psychiatric symptoms measured 
by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory scale. Another index of depression used by Twenge et 
al. (2015) is based on mental symptoms as reported in the survey ‘Monitoring the Future’. 
13
 Consistently with the Easterlin paradox, the USA exhibits both high levels of subjective well-being and 
high levels of GDP per-capita in cross-country samples (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). However, 
consistently with our characterisation of the USA, some evidence shows that subjective well-being is 
positively correlated with the intervention of the state across countries (Ott, 2011; O’Connor, 2017; 
Kasmaoui and Bourhaba, 2017).  
14
 The indicator of ‘secure social attachment’ is based on the following survey question: “It is easy for me 
to become emotionally close to others. I am comfortable depending on others and having others depend on 
me. I don’t worry about being alone or having others not accept me” (Konrath et al., 2014). 
15
 The UK seems to follow the US example, because economic growth has been definitely positive in the 
most recent decades, but a variety of measures indicate a rising trend of mental problems in the 
population: teenage children of all social classes experienced emotional and conduct problems almost 
twice as frequently in 1999 than in 1974 (Collishaw et al., 2004); a similar trend emerged for depression 
and anxiety among British youths in the period 1986-2006 (Collishaw et al., 2010); the rise of such 
psychological distress for young women in the period 1991-2008 is confirmed by research using the 
General Health Questionnaire (Ross et al., 2017). Although subjective well-being remained almost 
constant in the period 1996-2008 (Clark et al., 2012), job satisfaction declined in the period 1994-2012 
(Green and Tsitsianis, 2005; Green et al., 2013). 
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6. How the economic progress erodes the enjoyment of time and of social 
relationships 
 
If people behaved like homo sapiens, modern economic progress would certainly 
play a positive role in their well-being. That is to say, people would increasingly use the 
resources and opportunities thus made available to plan more ambitious projects, both at 
work and in life, and to refine the search for suitable partners to carry them out. As 
people learn, they further develop their agentic skill, conceive new projects, and are 
better able to teach their children and others how to do this, thereby helping to develop 
overall well-being and human culture.  
By contrast, homo economicus does not need to develop these skills. Rather, he 
suggests achieving well-being in another more immediate and certain way made possible 
by the abundance of products offered by economic progress. His suggestion is to 
consume as enjoyment in itself, and to achieve this goal better if specific skills should be 
acquired. 
People are thus faced with two options: devoting time to develop their agentic 
and social skill, as homo sapiens would suggest; pursuing well-being through 
consumption goods, as homo economicus would suggest. One might think of a meta-
utility function with two sub-utility functions, which, moreover, may have some goods 
as common arguments. 
Modern economic progress affects people’s choice between the two options, i.e. 
it pushes homo economicus’ suggestion far beyond the simple relaxation of people’s 
budget constraints, because it makes consumption especially attractive. Specifically, 
three mechanisms can be identified at the origin of such attraction. The first mechanism 
refers to the well-known ‘Baumol’s cost disease’ (Baumol 1967; Nordhaus, 2008; Wolff 
et al., 2014).
16
 As seen above, people’s interaction in pursuit of life projects can be 
modelled as an individual’s production and consumption of public goods. This is an 
activity that requires the individual’s time as an essential and hardly compressible input, 
not only because developing the skill of agency and interacting with others unavoidably 
takes time, but also because this is part of an individual’s pleasant life time.
17
 If s/he 
acquired this ability instantly thanks to some magic machine, s/he could not be proud of 
having accomplished useful projects. By contrast, production- and some consumption-
activities can be performed with increasing productivity, i.e. by compressing time per 
unit of output, mostly thanks to technical progress. Therefore, producing the public good 
that enables the individual to exercise his/her agency and effectively interact with others 
suffers from Baumol’s cost disease, because it is increasingly costly with respect to the 
activities that mostly use technology. Consuming market products thus becomes 
increasingly convenient. 
The second mechanism that is driven by economic progress and makes 
consumption attractive per se operates through the special characteristic of an increasing 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
16
 A consequence of the disease is evident in the surprising decline of the rate of high school graduates in 
the USA from the 1970s to the mid-2000s (Heckman, 2008). 
17
 Time is clearly little compressible in child education, socialisation and mental development (Gopnik, 
2009; Herrmann et al, 2010), in effective learning (Immordino-Yang, 2016), and in creative activity (Sio 
and Ormerod, 2011), because, at least, emotions are necessary in human development, and they especially 
need the functioning of the physical body (Damasio, 1994). 
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number of industrial products and connected services: demanding time from individuals 
to enjoy consumption. The typical modern example is the use of digital devices for 
entertainment and for living in virtual connection with others. This has been a major 
change in technological innovations because many products are no longer designed only 
to relieve effort and to save the consumer’s time, like the washing machine, for example. 
High-tech products become increasingly attractive because they promise certain, 
immediate, and effortless enjoyment, and because they demand time that the individual 
may otherwise devote to developing his/her agentic and social skill.
18
 
The third mechanism is triggered by economic progress but it is psychological in 
nature. Since economic growth usually proceeds with crises and accelerations, and with 
an unequal impact on the population, many individuals experience relative 
impoverishment, either with respect to the past or with respect to others, or both. These 
economic shocks are made especially painful by the possible deprivations, but also by 
the effect that Daniel Kahneman called ‘loss aversion’, according to which “the 
aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 
279). In order to alleviate such pain and insecurity in the future, the individuals may 
concentrate their efforts on attempting to restore their preceding economic conditions, 
even if any serious deprivation is absent. If the economic recovery is delayed, or if 
individuals’ absolute enrichment does not change their worsened relative positions on 
the income scale, they persist in the attempt, with the consequence of downplaying their 
more creative projects, and of depreciating their skills. In these conditions, the 
consumption of market products appears to be an immediate though limited 
compensation (DeSarbo and Edwards, 1996).
19
 
The final result is that the third mechanism triggered by economic progress 
makes the first two mechanisms mutually reinforcing, so that, together with the further 
depreciation of individuals’ skills, consumption appears to individuals to be the only 
feasible way to achieve well-being.
 
 
However, the consumption way to well-being is not as effective as it promises for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, people enjoy consumption relatively to the social context. 
In particular, if the incomes of everyone increase, individual relative income may not 
increase, so that enjoyment is less than expected (Easterlin, 1995; Guven and Sørensen, 
2012; Clark et al., 2008). One could say that in this case homo economicus cannot 
effectively maximise utility because of negative social externality.
20
 Secondly, when 
individuals use consumption only to satisfy contingent wants and find it effective, they 
                                                 
18
 Evidence of this time substitution is provided by the use of leisure time, net of non-market work, by the 
US population. In the period 1965-2003, the most educated people increased the time spent watching TV 
by 5 hours per week, and reduced the time spent socializing and reading books by 9 hours. The least 
educated people increased the time spent watching TV by 9 hours per week, and reduced the time spent 
socializing and reading books by 6 hours (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007). Further evidence shows that young 
men in the USA used the increase of their leisure time between 2004 and 2015 mostly for recreational 
computer activities, while maintaining socialising time almost unchanged. Innovations in recreational 
technology consumption even seem to account for around a third of the surprising decline in youth 
participation in the labour market during that period (Aguiar et al., 2017). 
19
 Indeed, from the late 1970s to the mid-2010s, US workers reported a declining trend in the perception of 
job security and job tenure (Hollister and Smith, 2014; Fullerton and Wallace, 2007), and psychological 
studies document that such economic insecurity is a stressor for overall well-being (Butler, 2019), and that 
the frequent reaction to insecurity is to pursue more ambitious financial goals (Sheldon and Kasser, 2008). 
20
 If individuals draw utility from relative consumption alone, intertemporal maximisation can achieve 
constant utility, while generating positive economic growth (Hof and Prettner, 2019). 
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tend to repeat the consumption of the same products or, more generally, of the same 
Lancasterian characteristics. However, this behaviour may push individuals to 
habituation, which is a psychological effect that to some extent reduces the enjoyment of 
consuming (Di Tella et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2008).
21
 Thirdly, habituation may 
degenerate into behavioural or substance addiction. This change can be triggered by a 
severely negative economic or social shock, so that specific forms of consumption 
appear as powerful antidotes against the pains of deprivation and disappointments. But 
once triggered, such consumption becomes a trap, because craving for it alters all other 
behaviours in individuals’ lives, with damaging effects on their health.
22
  
Harmful addiction triggered by an attempt to self-medicate can become a 
widespread phenomenon because it includes many forms of consumption (Sussman et al., 
2011). It can also become a very serious phenomenon when it takes specific forms, such 
as the consumption of opioids in the USA (Ruhm, 2018). Individuals’ myopia 
concerning the consequences of addictive behaviours may have a role, as argued in 
behavioural economics (Herrnstein and Prelec, 1992; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). 
But such failure of perfect foresight, which is typical of homo economicus, is not 
necessary to explain addiction in the case of self-medication. In fact, people can be well-
informed about harmful addiction, but they may fail to foresee the advantages that they 
are losing, i.e. the resources that their agentic and social skill could have generated.
23
 
In conclusion, modern economic progress induces individuals to progressively 
prefer the consumption way to well-being, because the weakening of their agentic and 
social skill tends to preclude the other way, and because consumption behaviour 
becomes self-reinforcing. In this case, enjoyment derived from consumption is only 
focused on the present, because past and future are perceived as costly or irrelevant. But 
if individuals are able to escape the erosive effects of economic progress and develop 
their agentic and social skill, such activity itself becomes their central focus, whereas 
comparing their material endowments with those of others does not attract much 
interest,
24
 and habituation is confined to instrumental activities. In this case, individuals 
enjoy the present together with the past and the future, since they are realising projects 
conceived in the past, and they are laying the bases for imagining new projects for the 
future.
25
 
 
                                                 
21
 This adaptation is clearly incomplete when people fall into poverty (Clark et al., 2016). 
22
 The evidence on this is quite abundant. Popovic and French (2013) find a positive and significant 
association between job loss during the past year and the probability of an alcohol abuse and/or 
dependence diagnosis. Pudney (2004) finds that individuals who enter a long spell of unemployment have 
an 80-90% increase in their expected level of cumulated consumption of cannabis, irrespective of their 
income. Moschion and Powdthavee (2018) find that, in a sample of disadvantaged individuals, a drop in 
life satisfaction tends to precede the use of illegal drugs. The experimental study by Rockloff et al. (2011) 
shows that individuals, previously primed with negative self-reflection, gamble more intensively. Finally, 
Heckman et al. (2006) find that failing to develop cognitive and socio-emotional skills most likely induces 
individuals to undertake behaviours at risk of harmful addiction. 
23
 As Cutler et al. (2010) show, being informed about the harms of addiction is less important than the 
ability to process that information, which can be acquired through education. 
24
 As Clark and Senik (2010) and Bartolini et al. (2020) show, comparing one’s own income with that of 
others seems less important for people who attach less value to success and wealth, and have rich social 
lives. 
25
 In support of this conclusion, a psychology study finds that thinking about the past and the future is 
negatively associated with people’s self-reported happiness, interpreted as simple needs satisfaction, but 
positively associated with self-reported meaningfulness, interpreted as life purpose (Baumeister et al., 
2013). 
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Conclusions  
 
‘Enjoying life takes time and needs people.’ This simple truth suggests that time 
and social relationships are resources to be enjoyed in themselves, rather than being only 
considered as costs or means. By contrast, ‘economic progress runs and offers things’ 
means that people’s time is used more and more intensively for production, and that 
consumption products are offered as goals for enjoyment. 
This paper has argued that individuals can choose between these two ways 
leading to well-being, and that economic growth tends to weaken the first and most 
effective way. Both arguments are rather new, but a variety of empirical findings in 
support of them has been cited and addressed by drawing on economic and extra-
economic streams of research. 
The first way to well-being derives from the evolution of humankind, whose 
success with respect to the other animals is due to humans’ ‘agentic and social skill’, i.e. 
the skill to imagine and collectively build a reality different from the natural one. 
Developing such skill in accordance with both individuals’ inner talents and the 
opportunities offered by the social and economic context provides the special enjoyment 
of exercising agency in interaction with others. Such enjoyment is special because it is 
able to self-sustain and is resilient to life’s adversities. The second way to well-being is 
to pursue the pleasure of consuming market products as the final goal. This is what 
mainstream economics suggests, and what appears to be a widespread phenomenon. 
Economic growth tends to weaken the first way to well-being, and to reinforce 
the second one, thus making them substitutable. The paper has identified three 
mechanisms whereby economic growth has these effects. The triggering mechanism 
starts with the adversities due to the economic crises, inequalities, the material and social 
deprivations that people suffer. Once triggered, the self-reinforcing mechanisms which 
can operate during economic progress are two: the reduction in the special production of 
‘agentic and social skill’ which is subject to Baumol’s cost disease; the increase of high-
tech consumption, which is pleasant but demands an ever greater proportion of 
individuals’ time. 
The policy implications of this interpretation would suggest strengthening 
people’s human skill, thus making them able to cope with adversities and to flourish, no 
less than reducing the adversities themselves. This means investing in young children, in 
cultural goods, and in mental health care no less than counteracting economic recessions, 
inequalities and deprivations. This extra intervention is particularly needed because of 
the exceptional positive externalities arising from early childhood development,
26
 
culture,
27
 and mental health.
28
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Investments in young children
 
have high rates of return, high benefit-to-cost ratios, and they even escape 
the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off, yet they are in fact far less than optimal – according to Heckman 
(2008). 
27
 Culture generates positive externalities because it has social value, option value, existence value, 
innovation value, and intergenerational value – according to van der Ploeg (2006). 
28
 Mental disorders have higher economic costs (direct and indirect) than other diseases, and their 
treatment has a higher cost-benefit ratio, but investments in this field are lower – according to Trautmann 
et al. (2016). 
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